Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy:’ A Paradigm Shift?
Authours: Jianwei Wang
Date: 2018

When dealing with neighboring countries and related issues, we need
a multidimensional perspective that extends beyond the immediate
confines
of time and space.
— Xi Jinping
Abstract:
China’s diplomacy has undergone a sea of changes under Xi Jinping’s
rein. But there is no consensus on the nature, scope, essence and
direction of these changes. This article aims to explore both the changes
and continuities in Chinese foreign affairs under the Xi Jinping leadership
through the lens of his recently much-advocated formulation of ‘major
country diplomacy with distinctive Chinese features’. Tracing the evolution,
manifestation and causes of Xi’s ‘major country diplomacy’, it is
argued that Xi’s diplomacy is a clear departure from Deng Xiaoping’s
TGYH ([Tao Guang Yang Hui] low profile) strategy and therefore transformative
in nature. On the other hand, however, his strong adherence to
the core realist assumptions about national security issues makes his
idealistic and liberal global vision and his efforts to transcend ‘the traditional
Western theories of international relations’ more difficult to
accomplish. In this respect, the glass is still half full and half empty.
China’s diplomacy has experienced significant changes under the reign of Xi Jinping in a short time
span of five years. Unlike his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who largely focused on
domestic affairs in their first terms, Xi has been in full swing in foreign affairs from the very
beginning. Indeed, one can argue that he has devoted at least equal amount of time and energy, if
not more, on diplomacy traveling all over the world1 and ushering in new foreign policy initiatives,
concepts and discourse with dazzling speed. Entering the last year of his first term in 2017,
highlevel
foreign affair officials and pundits began to trumpet the so-called Xi Jinping thought of
diplomacy. This is extraordinary as the term ‘thought’ was applied to Xi’s diplomatic rather than
his
domestic achievements first. In addition, if one looks back to history, for Jing Zemin era the same
term did not appear until late in his second term. It was not even mentioned to describe Hu
Jintao’s diplomacy.
While there is largely a consensus on noticeable changes of China’s diplomacy under Xi both at
home and abroad, there is no consensus on the nature, scope, essence and direction of these
changes. Analysts outside of the mainland China like to use words such as ‘China’s new
assertiveness’,2 ‘insecure nationalism’3 and ‘offensive realism’4 to portrait these changes while
pundits in China, however, tend to describe Xi’s diplomacy as more cosmopolitan, proactive,
path-breaking
and compassionate. The truth, however, is always more complicated than those labels
may suggest. This article attempts to explore these issues about the changes in Chinese foreign
affairs under the Xi Jinping leadership through the lens of his recently much-advocated formulation
of ‘major country diplomacy with distinctive Chinese features’, which is supposed to serve as an
overarching framework for Xi Jinping’s diplomacy.
Chinese diplomacy 3.0?
Actually, the term ‘major country diplomacy’ in the vocabulary of Chinese diplomacy is not something
entirely new. As a matter of fact, it has frequently been used in Chinese foreign policy
documents and literature. But usually it refers to China’s efforts to manage relations with other
major powers such as the USA, Russia, European Union, and to less extent, Japan and India. It is
also true that Chinese government and leaders often referred China as a ‘major country’(daguo) in
their foreign policy statements to highlight its important position and weighty roles in
international
relations, which can be seen as preludes to Xi’s ‘major country diplomacy’, but not ‘major country
diplomacy’ per se. Put it in a different way, China is a major country in diplomacy, but its
diplomacy
is not necessarily based on the assumption that China is a ‘major country’. For example, the Tao
Guang Yang Hui (conceal one’s ability and bide one’s time) strategy under Deng Xiaoping was not
taking ‘major country’ as a starting point. It is under Xi Jinping’s leadership that China began to
more consciously and systematically pursue ‘major country diplomacy’. In other words, China needs
to think and pursue diplomacy from the vantage point as a major country with more influence,
discourse power and responsibilities. By logic, this will render Deng’s low-profile diplomacy
irrelevant to major country diplomacy. More importantly, what China should peruse is not just
diplomacy as a normal or ordinary major country, but diplomacy with ‘distinctive Chinese features’
or ‘Chinese characteristics’. That means by definition China’s major country diplomacy should be
different from the diplomacy of other major countries implying the uniqueness of China’s diplomacy.
Therefore, the concept itself reflects the ‘distinctive Chinese feature’ already as no other
major powers would formally claim to pursue diplomacy of their own characteristics. Another
uniqueness about China’s ‘major country diplomacy’ is its efforts to keep a distance from ‘power’ as
reflected in its English translation. Instead of using the more common English translation of ‘major
power’ or ‘great power’, China prefers to use ‘major country’ to avoid the negative connotation
related to the word ‘power’ and the impression that the advocacy of ‘major country diplomacy’
could mean that China intends to seek hegemony (qiangquan).5
Xi Jinping leadership began to elaborate on the concept of major country diplomacy soon after
he took office. It was first introduced by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi merely 100 days after Xi
took over power. At the World Peace Forum in June 2013, Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a
keynote speech6 in which he pointed out that with China’s increasing economic weight in world
economy and related contributions to the world development, ‘China is already standing under
world’s limelight’, China under the new leadership headed by Xi Jinping is ready to explore a new
path of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.
This theme of major country diplomacy has been reiterated and further emphasized at the
highest level by Xi Jinping when he made an important speech at the central conference on
China’s foreign affairs in 2014.7 He asserted that China should develop its distinctive diplomatic
approach befitting its role of a major country. China’s major country diplomacy should have
distinctive ‘Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner’.
In 2016,Foreign Minister Wang Yi further substantiated the concept of major country diplomacy
with Chinese characteristics. He began to use the term of ‘theory of major country diplomacy
with Chinese characteristics’ turning a concept into a theory. He pointed out that this theory is a
top-level design supported by five pillars including a community of shared destiny of mankind,
people development, win-win cooperation, partnerships and correct understanding of justice and
interest.8
Starting from 2017 in which Chinese Communist Party was making preparation for its epic 19th
party congress, the level of official articulation of Xi’s diplomatic thinking had been elevated.
State
Councilor Yang Jiechi published two long articles to authoritatively expound Xi’s concepts and
practice in diplomacy. In his article published in January 2017 in People’s Daily,9 for the first
time he
used the term of ‘Xi Jinping thought on diplomacy’. He declared that Xi scientifically answered a
series of major questions regarding China’s diplomacy under new situation including task, goal,
pathway, strategy, tactic, institution and mechanism. According to Yang, Xi’s thought on diplomacy
is a ‘scientific, systemic and complete ideological system’. Among other contributions Xi has made,
Yang mentioned the establishment of ‘theoretical system of major country diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics’. Xi emphasized that China should have its major country diplomacy with its own
characteristics; ‘It is a logo, a banner’. Then in July 2017, Yan published another major article on
Xi’s
thought on diplomacy.10 Once again, he asserted that Xi’s thought on diplomacy is a ‘comprehensive
and profound system of theories with rich connotations’. Under the guidance of Xi’s thought
on diplomacy, China ‘has become more confident in pursuing major-country diplomacy with
Chinese characteristics, fully demonstrating its distinctive vision, style and way of conduct as a
major country’.
In September, two months before the 19th Party Congress, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi
published yet another article on Xi’s diplomatic thought11 in which he argued that Xi laid out
creatively a series of ‘new vision, new thinking and new strategies’ for China’s diplomacy. The
first
and foremost component of Xi’s thought on diplomacy is ‘major-country diplomacy with Chinese
features’. In this article, Wang’s compliment of Xi’s diplomatic thought reached a new high claiming
that it ‘has made innovations on and transcended the traditional Western theories of international
relations for the past 300 years’. At the most recently held Centeral Conference Relating to Foreign
Affairs in June 2018, Xi’s diplomatic thought formally obtained the ‘guiding position’ in conducting
foreign affairs. In his own articulation, Xi put ‘major country diplomacy’ at the prominent position
of his diplomatic thought.12
From this cursory review of the development of the concept of ‘major country diplomacy with
Chinese characteristics’, it is not difficult to see that ‘major country diplomacy’ occupies an
important position in the so-called Xi Jinping’s thought on diplomacy. It is no longer just a
concept
or an idea, but already a theoretical system. Comparing the discussion of Yang Jiechi’s two articles
on Xi’s thoughts on diplomacy, one can find that the main content he articulated on Xi Jinping’s
thoughts on diplomacy and major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics shares many
similarities. In a way, it can be argued that Xi’s major country diplomacy is another name for Xi’s
thought on diplomacy. Some Chinese analysts argue that the advent of ‘major country diplomacy’
indicates that the diplomacy of People’s Republic of China (PRC) has entered a new stage. Major
country diplomacy could be considered PRC diplomacy 3.0, which is different from the ‘revolutionary
diplomacy’ (1.0) in 1949–1979 and ‘development diplomacy’ (2.0) in 1979–2009. Major
country diplomacy is more aimed at reforming international order and international system rather
than just focusing on economic development.13 Others also agree that under Xi Jinping diplomacy,
economic interest is no longer the most important and overwhelming consideration in Chinese
diplomacy. Rather the political rationale for nurturing an international environment for the great
renewal of Chinese nation has become the new strategic goal of Chinese diplomacy.14
At the center of the world stage
Why did Xi advocate ‘major country diplomacy’ at this juncture? It is based on his assessment of
current situation and trend in international affairs and the change of China’s position in the
international system. Although facing many challenges in diplomacy since he came to power,
Xi’s overall estimate of China’s external environment remains optimistic. With the ups and downs of
Sino-American relations, particularly after the Obama administration initiated the Asia Rebalance
strategy to push back China and the intensification of maritime disputes in the East and South
China Seas, the Chinese foreign policy community has long debated whether the so-called the
period of strategic opportunity, first suggested by Jiang Zemin, has ended. While being aware of
the tension, contest, struggle and uncertainties in China’s international environment, Xi
nevertheless
concluded that all factors considered, China is still in an important period of strategic
opportunity for its development.15 This judgement was reconfirmed in his most recent report to
the 19th Party Congress although he did emphasize that while the prospects are bright, the
challenges are severe.16 More recently, facing serious challenges from Donald Trump’s all-out
foreign policy offensive on trade, South China Sea and Taiwan, Xi Jinping insists that China is in
its best period of development since modern times.17
But more crucial is Xi Jinping’s evolving perception of China’s status in the current international
system. While previous Chinese leaders since Mao largely considered China at the periphery or
semi-periphery of the existing and Western-dominated international system,18 Xi believes that it is
no longer the case. Instead China has moved from periphery or semi-periphery to the center. He
pointed out ‘in explicit terms’ that China is ‘closer than ever to the center of the global stage’,
‘closer than ever to fulfilling the Chinese dream of national renewal “and therefore” more confident
and able than ever to realize this goal’.19
Position determines attitude. Since China is almost at the center of the world stage with
correspondent capabilities, it cannot continue the TGYH (low profile and hands-off) approach as
designed by Deng Xiaoping anymore. Before Xi came to power, with China’s increasing power
influence in world affairs, Chinese foreign policy community already started to debate whether
China should continue Deng Xiaoping’s undeclared low-profile strategy of ‘conceal one’s abilities
and hide one’s intention’.20 Some veteran Chinese diplomats such as Wu Jianmin argued that
Deng’s doctrine should remain intact.21 Immediately after Xi assumed office, one could still hear
voices for keeping TGYH. But not anymore. Xi’s ‘major country diplomacy’ literally put an end to
this debate. In this sense, Xi’s major country diplomacy is a replacement of Deng Xiaoping’s
lowprofile
diplomacy. Instead of following Deng’s advice of ‘never taking a lead’ in international affairs,
Xi advocates that China should just do the opposite: ‘leading’ the trend of international affairs.22
This is not just what China wants to do but also the expectation of the international community. As
he put it, ‘The world is so big, and the problems are so many. The international community expects
to hear China’s voice and see China’s inputs’, Therefore, ‘China cannot be absent’.23 This is in
sharp
contrast to the ‘leaving China alone’ mentality manifested by Chinese leaders before Xi.
Xi’s major country diplomacy therefore is undeclared but clear negation of Deng Xiaoping’s
lowprofile
diplomacy and therefore transformative in nature. This paradigm shift has been reflected in
many aspects of Chinese diplomacy under Xi that will be discussed in more details in other articles
in this special issue. More relevant to the discussion here is that Xi’ diplomatic initiatives are
not
just policy-oriented but conceptual and constructive-oriented. Xi is particularly fond of enhancing
China’s discourse power in international relations which has long been dominated by Western
concepts and theories of international relations. From ‘China dream’ ‘community of common
destiny of mankind’ to ‘new type of major country relations’ to ‘win-win cooperation’, Xi Jinping
is determined to inject Chinese concepts and ideas into the narratives of world affairs. Xi has been
especially energetic in selling his new concepts and discourse to the world. For example, it is said
that wherever he goes he never forgets to talk about the concept of ‘community of shared destiny
for mankind’.24 Chinese official media outlet takes particular pride when such a discourse is
accepted by the international community such as the UN Security Council resolutions.25 The
most recent progress is that the term found its way in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s
Qingdao declaration.26
To summarize, in multiple areas of international affairs, Xi Jinping’s ‘major country diplomacy’
indicates
that China has qualitatively departed from Deng Xiaoping’s lowprofile and non-involvement approach
to
more comprehensively, systematically and actively not just participating in but also shaping
international
affairs as a power not at the peripheral but the center of the world stage. In doing so, he
displayed a
tendency to globalize and generalize his new discourse and policy initiatives. For example, both
‘community
of shared destiny’ and ‘one belt and one road’ initially were proposed at the regional level, but
very soon they have evolved into a sort of global and open-ended discourse.
Return of Idealism
Besides keeping low profile, another hallmark of Deng Xiaoping’s diplomacy is pragmatism based
on his famous political philosophy that ‘it doesn’t matter whether a cat is a white or black, as
long
as it catches mice’. As a result, value and morality do not have much place in Deng’s foreign policy
thinking. Chinese foreign policy under Deng is mainly about China, not about the world. The main
task of Chinese diplomacy is to create a peaceful environment for China’s economic modernization,
not necessarily to make the world better. Narrowly defined Chinese national interest, rather than
universal value and moral standard, is the guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy under Deng
and his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Consequently, Chinese foreign policy was often
described as ‘hard-core realism’ and ‘hard-core mercantilism’.
In this respect, Xi Jinping also diverged from his predecessors. Once again, he is committed to
introducing idealistic and moralistic elements into China’s diplomacy. The underlying assumption
for this push is that a big country or major power cannot just pursue interest but also justice.
From
the very beginning, Xi’s foreign policy articulation is colored by his idealistic and moralistic
impulse.
Soon after he took power, Xi Jinping introduced the phrase ‘Chinese dream’ to mobilize the public
support for his political course and to aspire the Chinese people. According to him, the greatest
Chinese dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. More concretely and in foreseeable
future, Chinese dream is about the realization of two centennial goals of finishing building a
moderately prosperous society in all respects by the centenary of the CPC in 2021 and of turning
China into a modern socialist country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious by
the centenary of the PRC in 2049.27
Originally targeted at the domestic audience, ‘Chinese dream’ soon found its way in China’s
diplomatic discourse. Rather than portraying it as a narrowly defined concept just for the interest
of
China, Xi used the slogan as a means to convey the common aspiration between China and other
countries and the benign intentions of China as a rapidly rising power. In a speech delivered in
Paris to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China-French diplomatic
relations in 2014, in addition to mentioning the domestic context of the Chinese dream such as
the renewal of the Chinese nation and the quest for happiness, he also emphasized the international
connotation of the Chinese dream including the pursuit of peace and making contribution to
the common good of the world declaring an awaken sleeping China lion is a ‘peaceful, amicable
and civilized one’.28 He also drew a parallel between the Chinese dream and the French dream
which offer opportunities to each other. The similar lines of narrative have been repeated by Xi in
other countries when discussing the concept.
Still the Chinese dream is largely about the aspiration of Chinese people and does not answer
the question about what kind of the world China would like to strive for. In the past, Chinese
foreign policy was often criticized as strong in opposing others’ world vision without offering much
of its own. Xi realized that as a superpower in the making, China needs to offer its vision of the
future world. Here came the concept of ‘community of shared (common) destiny for mankind’. The
idea of a community, of course, is not new in the discourse of international relations. Some Chinese
pundits also long desired to build a kind of community among nation states. Zheng Bijian, a
leading strategic scholar who came up with the theory of China’s peaceful rise, for example, once
suggested to Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski that China and the USA should enlarge the
converging points of interest to establish a community of common interests in foreseeing the
future of Sino-American relations.29 The concept of community of common destiny for mankind
was not first coined by Xi Jinping either. As early as 2007, Chinese official media People’s Daily
used
the term to discuss the APEC meeting. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao mentioned the term when
talking about the natural disasters during his visit to Japan. The 18th Party Congress report in
2012
adopted this term by saying that China should ‘raise awareness of about human beings sharing a
community of common destiny’.30 But the concept was just mentioned in passing with no further
elaboration. It was Xi Jinping who attached unprecedented significance to the concept and began
to more consciously apply and articulate it to represent his worldview.
Xi Jinping first used the term ‘community of common destiny’ in his first meeting with foreign
guests in December 2012 after he was just elected general secretary of CPC at the 18th party
congress.31 He then applied it again in his speech to the students of Moscow College of
International Relations in March 2013.32 Since then he began to advocate this concept tirelessly
at most important international conferences. In a keynote speech at Boao Forum for Asia in 2015,
he promoted the community of common destiny in Asia, but a community of common interest for
all mankind.33 This is a very interesting differentiation. Maybe at that time he still considered
that
the world is too diversified to establish a community of common destiny while it is more plausible
to strive for such a community at the regional level. In the same speech, he called for China and
ASEAN countries to join hands in building a China-ASEAN community of common destiny. But as
alluded to earlier, very soon the scope of this concept was expanded to reach the global level. In
his first speech at the United Nations as Chinese president in September of the same year, he
applied the concept of community of common destiny for mankind.34 But for reasons unknown,
the English version of this concept turned out to be ‘community of shared future for mankind’. It
can be argued that ‘common destiny’ and ‘shared future’ do exhibit a difference of degree if not a
difference of kind. Again, it could be reasonably speculated that the translation has the effect to
water down the term to make it more acceptable to the international community.
Xi understands that if the concept of community of common destiny or shared future remains
empty and abstract, it will soon be forgotten just like Hu Jintao’s ‘humongous world’. In his
following speeches and remarks, Xi Jinping has made painstaking efforts to substantiate the
concept. In his most recent keynote address at a high-level dialogue with world political parties,
he declared that the 19th Party Congress ‘reaffirmed China’s genuine desire to work together with
the rest of the world to build a community with a shared future for mankind (CSFM)’. He further
clarified that the term means ‘the destiny and future of each and every nation and country are
interlocked’. More specifically he elaborated that this CSFM means a world of universal security
free
from fear, a world of common prosperity free from poverty, an open and inclusive world free from
isolation and a green, clean and beautiful world.35 Although the articulation still sounds too good
to be true, it nevertheless represents China’s global vision of what kind of world it intends to
strive
for. It indicates that after several decades of pragmatic diplomacy largely focusing on China’s own
interest and well-being, Chinese diplomacy once again began to view China’s relations with rest of
the world from the perspective of mankind. As Yang Jiechi put it, the vision reflects Xi Jinping’s
‘strong sense of historical mission’, and ‘a keen sense of responsibility for the whole mankind’.
Bearing in mind the responsibility of the leader of a major country, Xi ‘has reflected deeply on the
critical issue of what kind of a world we should build and how to build it, an issue that concerns
the
future of mankind’.36 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi also takes the building of ‘CSFM’ as the
overarching goal for Xi Jinping’s ‘major country diplomacy’. He declared that this concept puts
Chinese diplomacy on a high moral ground.37 In short, ‘CSFM’ has become the ‘symbolic icon’ of
Xi’s diplomacy.38
While the CSFM is an idealistic vision for the future, to move the world closer to such a destiny,
it needs first to establish ‘new type of international relations’ underlined by some new universal
norms. Among other things, Xi Jinping and his associates trumped the norm of win-win cooperation
as another pillar for his major country diplomacy. This is considered the core value for the ‘new
type of international relations’ that Xi Jinping has been advocating. It is also a new addition to
the
evolution of Chinese understanding of the current time.39 This norm is aimed at countering the
perceived traditional Western norms underlying international relations such as zero-sum game,
winner takes all, seeking absolute security and going beyond the traditional Western international
relations theories. It is the ‘comprehensive generalization’ of various initiative and proposals
that
China put forward in recent years.40 Xi in his various speeches emphasized the importance of
pursuing win-win cooperation to promote a new type of international relations indicating that this
norm should be applied to every aspect of China’s diplomacy such as political, economic, security
and cultural fields.41 He categorically rejected ‘the law of the jungle where the strong prey on the
weak’ and the pursuit to ‘establish China’s own sphere of influence’.42 It is on these grounds
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi claimed that Xi’s thought on diplomacy transcended the Western
theories of international relations for the past 300 years.
Related to the new norms and values for the new type of international relations, Xi has also tried
to reintroduce morality into China’s diplomacy. He advocated the so-called new concept of
morality and interest in Chinese diplomacy, particularly in its relations with developing and
neighboring countries. While China should emphasize both morality and interest in its dealing
with developing countries, it should put morality before interest when necessary.43 China should
champion and uphold justice in international relations, acting in good faith and valuing
friendship.44 As he put it, ‘We have always aspired to create a better world in which “a just
cause is pursued for the common good”’.45 He argued that justice is the faith of the Chinese
communists and Chinese nation. It is not a good thing that some people live well in this world,
while others do not. The true happiness is the shared and common happiness. Therefore, China
hopes that the world can develop together. To realize that, China has the duties to assist
developing countries. Sometimes China should sacrifice interest for justice. China should never
work exclusively for interest and haggle over every penny in diplomacy.46 This moralistic dimension
of Xi’s thought is considered a value orientation for his major country diplomacy. This so-called
right approach to justice and interest is said to become a banner to highlight China’s soft power.47
Xi Jinping sometimes also reveals his personal passionate side towards world affairs: ‘Seeing the
people trapped deep in suffering and war, we should have compassion and sympathy, but also
take responsibilities and action’.48
In his speeches and remarks to the international community, Xi Jinping often tried to cite
‘touching examples’ of China’s win-win cooperation with other countries as well as the right
balance between morality and interest. His signature Belt and Road Initiative (BIR) is often
portrayed in such a way. BIR is probably the most far-reaching and consequential diplomatic
initiative launched by Xi Jinping. According to him, it is the significant move to bring about a
community with a shared future for mankind49 and a playground to practice the win-win cooperation.
As he stressed, this initiative was originated from China but belongs to the whole world.50 The
purpose of the Belt and Road construction is to take China’s development as an opportunity to
allow more countries to take a ride of China’s fast train of development and to help them to realize
their own development goals. He requests that during the process of constructing the Belt and
Road, while developing its own interest, China should also give more consideration to and take
good care of other countries’ interests. China should find a good balance between justice and
interest putting justice before interest. In doing so, China should avoid the instinct to seek quick
success and instant benefits and hence short-term behavior.51 Moreover, Xi made it very clear that
the purpose of the BRI is not for the geopolitical maneuvering, but for creating a new model of
win-win cooperation.52 In short, according to Xi, the BRI ‘has developed into an open and inclusive
platform of international cooperation and a widely welcomed public good for the global
community’.53
As mentioned earlier, Xi Jinping’s efforts to provide an idealistic vision of the future world and
to
create some new universal norms and moral standards should be understood in the context of
offering some alternatives to the Western visions and norms. Recognizing that it will be difficult
to
offer more appealing universal values in domestic governance given the limitation of the Chinese
political system, Xi initially saw more opportunities to shape values and norms governing relations
among nations. That probably can partially explain why Xi has devoted so much of his attention to
his diplomatic thought during his first term. But even with regard to the domestic governance, Xi
has become more confident lately in light of the political chaos in some Western countries
including the USA and failures of the so-called color revolution in some Middle Eastern and
African countries. As his chief diplomat, Yang Jiechi put it, ‘The Chinese Communists and
Chinese people are fully confident of offering Chinese input to human exploration of better social
systems’.54 This growing confidence reached a peak at the 19th Party Congress when Xi declared in
his report that socialism with Chinese characteristics ‘offers a new option for other countries and
nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence, and it
offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind’.55
Interestingly, however, for the most part the theoretical foundation for Xi Jinping’s global
idealism is not communist or socialist ideology, but Western liberalism. One important rationale
for his vision of a community of common/shared destiny for mankind is the deepening interdependence
among nation states. According to him, China’s dependence on the world and its
involvement in international affairs are deepening as are the world’s dependence on China and
its impact on China.56 An unprecedented degree of interdependence makes the world increasingly
a community of common interest and common destiny.57 In addition, the rapid development of
the Internet, big data, cloud computing, quantum satellite and artificial intelligence has made
human beings connected as never before. As a result, the destiny and future of all countries across
the world are increasingly intertwined.58 All these make the course of win-win cooperation a
necessity for nation states. The logic is simple: the more interdependent and connected nation
states are, the more common interest and destiny they will share, and the more they need to
cooperate with each other. Indeed, one important purpose of Xi Jinping’s BRI is to further increase
the connectivity among nation states. It is all-inclusive and not targeted at any particular
country59
—if successful certainly a very important step towards the community of common destiny or share
future.
Xi Jinping’s embrace of economic liberalism which values interconnectivity, interdependence
and integration is further demonstrated by his passionate endorsement of globalization which is
largely responsible for interdependence. In his high-profile keynote speech at the World Economic
Forum in Davos in 2017,60 he strongly defended economic globalization by saying that many
problems troubling the world are not caused by economic globalization. Just blaming economic
globalization for the world’s problems is inconsistent with reality, and it will not help solve the
problems. While economic globalization does create some new problems such as unequal distribution
of economic benefits within and between countries, it promoted economic growth,
facilitated movement of goods and capital and advances in science, technology and civilization,
and interaction among peoples. More importantly, economic globalization is not something
created by any individuals or countries. Rather it is a historical trend, that the international
community needs to adapt to. He boasted that China made a right strategic choice to integrate
into economic globalization. Xi Jinping firmly believes that whether one likes it or not, the
process
of economic globalization cannot be reversed and will continue. What countries can do is not to
stop economic globalization but to make it more inclusive and solve the problem of fairness and
justice.61 In this process of re-globalization or globalization 2.0, China should and could play a
‘leading role’ to make it a ‘more open, inclusive and balanced process that delivers win-win
outcomes to all’.62
Stick with realism
Incorporating idealism and liberalism into his major country diplomacy, however, does not mean Xi
Jinping is ready to modify or abandon realism in managing China’s security relations with the
outside world. Economic liberalism and security realism could co-exist in Xi Jinping’s thought on
diplomacy although sometimes they do clash with each other. It is widely believed in the
international
community that Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping has become more assertive and
aggressive, another less soothing manifestation of discarding Deng Xiaoping’s TGYH diplomacy.
There is some truth in it and Xi Jiping’s thinking on security issues could lead to more hardline
policies in Chinese diplomacy.
First of all, in recent years, China has displayed a tendency to expand its definition of national
interest, particularly the so-called core national interest. The term used to be reserved only to
Taiwan. But during the Hu Jintao era, he and his chief foreign policy advisor Dai Bingguo came up
with a much broad and general definition of core national interest: China’s diplomacy must
safeguard the interests of Chinese sovereignty, security and development.63 However, including
a specific foreign policy issue in the category of core national interest is always a sensitive
matter.
For example, the Obama administration’s return to Asia strategy was in no small part prompted by
the reported Chinese attempt to define the South China Sea as China’s core national interest in
2010. Some Chinese scholars dismissed such comments as reckless and unauthorized at that
time.64 Yet it became clearer under the Xi Jinping government that the South China Sea does
fall into China’s core interest. State Councilor Yang Jiechi in his article on Xi Jinping’s
diplomatic
thought stated: ‘Since the 18th Party Congress, we have particularly staked out our positions on
Taiwan, the South China Sea and other issues concerning China’s major core interests.’65 This is the
most explicit statement so far that the South China Sea and related maritime interest and rights are
China’s core national interest. As soon as an issue is defined as a core national interest, it often
implies that the Chinese government has little room to compromise and more forceful actions
could be justified in case the core interest is violated. That could well explain China’s more
forceful
behavior on the South China Sea exemplified by the large-scale land reclamation.
The more expansive and explicit definition of China’s national interest during the Xi Jinping era
is also related to another aspect of his new way of thinking on diplomacy. That is the so-called
bottom-line thinking. Xi first mentioned this idea at an important meeting in early 2013. Then he
repeatedly mentioned it dozen times in various public speeches and articles. According to him,
policymakers ‘should be good at using the bottom-line thinking, everything from the bad preparation,
and strive for the best results, so that prepared, failing to panic, firmly grasp the initiative’.66
When it comes to applying this concept to the perceived core national interest, it means China
should draw some red lines that should be crossed under no circumstances. As Yang Jiechi put it,
since the 18th Party Congress, ‘We have drawn a clear line of what is unacceptable, and acted
forcefully to defend our core interests as well as legitimate rights.’67 Another implication for the
bottom-line thinking is Xi’s reinterpretation of China’s peaceful development or peaceful rise. This
is the constant theme of China’s self-image making to the international community since the Hu
Jintao period. With China’s security environment deteriorating until recently, the Chinese foreign
policy community engaged in a debate about whether China could rise peacefully even if it tries
very hard. Xi Jinping took the issue head-on. At a study session of the Communist Party of China
CPC) political bureau Xi declared that while China will stick with the path of peaceful development,
other countries should do the same. Only when all countries pursue a path of peaceful
development can they jointly develop and enjoy peaceful coexistence.68 His remarks were considered
drawing a ‘principle bottom line’ for China’s peaceful development.69 In other words,
China’s peaceful development is not unconditional and is contingent upon what other countries’
behavior is implying that there is a possibility for an unpeaceful rise if other countries pursue
unpeaceful policies towards China. This could also be seen as a response to the widely held
perception that China’s international behavior under Xi has become more assertive and less
peaceful since China’s tougher action could well be a response to the external hostile stimuli. It
is from such a logic of thinking that Xi declared on various occasions that while China will keep
its
peaceful development, it will never relinquish its legitimate rights and interests, or allow China’s
core interests to be undermined.70 ‘No country should presume that we will engage in trade
involving our core interests or that we will swallow the “bitter fruit” of harming our sovereignty,
security or development interests.’71 In his 2017 New Year speech he reiterated that ‘we have
adhered to the peaceful development while resolutely safeguarding the territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests of China. We will never tolerate any act that undermines our
territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights’.72 This, in Xi’s mind, is the minimum that China should uphold as a
major country. This bottom-line thinking on sovereignty and territorial integrity can also explain
the rationale behind his enhanced campaign to build a strong and more lethal military force since
he came to power.
The bottom-line thinking is also reflected in his handling of Taiwan issue since he came to
power. He could go extra miles to hold a historic meeting with the Taiwan leader Ma Ying-jeou
even when Ma was already a lame duck. But when current Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen failed to
recognize the 1992 consensus—the bottom-line, Xi showed little flexibility warning Tsai that
undermining the political foundation of cross-strait relations could lead to ‘earth moving and
mountain shaking’. It was also reported that Xi is losing patience on the Taiwan issue and has
the intention to settle the issue when he is in power as he said reportedly, ‘Taiwan issue has to be
settled eventually and cannot be postponed one generation after generation.’73 At the 19th Party
Congress, Xi Jinping used unprecedented eight ‘any’ to highlight his strong determination to stop
Taiwan independence:‘Any separatist activity is certain to meet with the resolute opposition of
the Chinese people. We have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat separatist
attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. We will never allow anyone, any organization, or
any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from
China’.74 For Xi, without solving this issue, China cannot be considered a qualified major power and
China’s rise is an unfinished business.
On the other hand, while the bottom-line thinking could occasionally lead to bellicose Chinese
behavior on security issues, it could also mean that Xi Jinping has no intention to pursue unlimited
offensive realism tomaximize China’s national interest and to establish a sphere of influence in the
region
as John Mearsheimer stipulated.75 What he wants to domostly is to hold the bottomline. Xi certainly
has
no plan to systematically change the status quo in East Asia in general and in the South China Sea
in
particular. The immediate goal of China is to hold the current line and improve China’s position
from being
unfavorable to favorable. Xi is also willing to make adjustments when facing pushing back and
backlash.
For example, China declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in East China Sea in 2013 but did
not
really enforce it. Facing possible negative reactions from the region, China so far has not declared
widely
anticipated ADIZ in the South China Sea. Beijing has largely muted in reacting to the more frequent
U.S.
FONO operations in the South China Sea. Inmost cases,what China exercised is still ‘reactive
assertiveness’
rather than ‘offensive realism’.
This ‘limited assertiveness’ or ‘calculated assertiveness’ is related to another basic component of
Xi
Jinping’s worldview. As much as closely related, connected and interdependent as nation states are
with
each other, power is still the dominant factor in world politics. While China has become much more
powerful than before, it is still not able to get all what it wants and therefore China must pick
and choose
the battles. This also applies to China’s participation in global governance. As Xi put it, the
global
governance structures depend on the international balance of power and reforms hinge on a change
in the balance.76 While China is now powerful enough to demand more say in global governance, it is
still
not in a position to overhaul the existing international system and to systematically change the
status quo.
China needs to seek more space within the current international order.77
Conclusion
Since he came topower, Xi Jipinghasworked diligently todevelophisown systemof thinking on foreign
policy. His thought on diplomacy is a complex system and it is difficult to grasp it with a
simplistic label.
From the above analysis, one can find various idealistic, liberal and realist elements in his
thinking. In this
respect, Xi Jinping’s thought on diplomacy resembles more a major power. John Ikenberry argued when
discussing the US grand strategy in East Asia that the US strategy is building ‘around American
power,
interests and ideals’. American strategy shouldnotbe ‘seen simply as a geopolitical strategy of
hegemony
or balance of power’. ‘Rather, it is infused with distinctive American ideas about order, identity,
and
community. It is a synthesis of realist and liberal thinking.’78 Withoutmuchmodification, his
diagnosis can
also be used to describe Xi’s diplomatic thinking. It can be further inferred that the more
conscious
synthesis of idealism and realism is also an indicator of major power diplomacy.
Xi’s thought on foreign policy is most typically reflected in his concept of ‘major country
diplomacy
with Chinese characteristics’. Given his assessment of China’s enhanced power position in the
international
system, Xi Jinping concluded that it is time for China to behave like a major country (power) in all
dimensions of international affairs: constructing more norms and discourse, making more initiatives,
taking more responsibilities, exercising more influence and providing more public goods. To put it
differently, China should behave more likely a major power rather than an ordinary country. In this
sense, Xi’s major county diplomacy is a clear departure from his predecessors’ low profile and
largely
reactive diplomacy and therefore could be considered a paradigm shift. The debate about ‘TGYH’ is
pretty much over. Xi Jinping’s more than five years in office has witnessed the most impressive
expansion in Chinse diplomacy in terms of discourse, interests, scope and domains. As Xi put it, ‘We
have seen a further rise in China’s international influence, ability to inspire, and the ability to
shape’.79
So much so that some Chinese scholars already began to worry about China’s diplomatic ‘overstretch’
or ‘overdraft’.80 Even hardcore realist scholars such as Yang Xuetong who long advocated more
confrontational approach in dealing with hegemonic power such as the USA warned about China’s
‘premature diplomatic advances’.81 Just a few years ago he declared that China would soon become a
superpower on parwith the USA and a new bipolar world has been emerging.82 But now he argues that
China’s power has not reached to the level of the USA yet and therefore should not pursue a foreign
policy of superpower at a global level. At most China is just a ‘regional superpower’. It cannot be
said
that Xi Jinping is not aware of the risk of excessive diplomatic expansion. He once warned that
while
China should actively participate in global governance and take more international responsibilities,
China should not ‘overreach ourselves’.83 But often in practice he seemed to be overwhelmed by the
momentumcreated by his impulse and eagerness for national greatness. The Belt and Road initiative is
a typical case to the point. Initially a reasonable and sensible regional initiative, with much
fanfare and
over sale, it now runs the risk of turning into an unlimited and boundless global campaign with
uncertain strategic and economic return.
Xi Jinping’s major country diplomacy theory also attempts to surpass the traditional Western
international relations theory and to falsify the Western prediction about the so-called Thucydides
Trap: the inevitable conflict between a rising power and an existing dominant power. To avoid this
historical foreordination Xi asserts that mankind needs to make a choice between two options. One
is vicious competition or even armed conflict for power and self-interest leading to disastrous
crisis
and the other is to go along with the tide of the times and rise to challenges through global
collaborations thus creating favorable conditions for building a community with a shared future for
mankind.84 Xi intends to convince the world that China has definitely made up its mind for the
latter, it is a rising power of a different kind in pursuing its foreign policy goals compared to
historical and current major powers and could help foster a new paradigm of international relations
which is characterized by connectivity, interdependence, win-win cooperation, equality and common
destiny. This paradigm shift, however, while maybe winning China some normative power in
world public opinion, has turned out to be more complicated and difficult to accomplish and could
be hampered by multiple factors in reality.
First of all, in pursuing his ‘major country diplomacy’, Xi Jinping tends to be more innovative on
economic and other functional issues than on security issues. Indeed, one can argue that his
mindset on traditional security issues is still quite old-fashioned and constrained by the
Westphalia
norms. On issues like sovereignty and territorial integrity, Xi displayed little new thinking. If
anything, he just turned out to be more resolute and assertive in defending China’s perceived
core national interest due to his understanding of China’s significantly enhanced national power.
The uncomfortable co-existence of political idealism, economic liberalism and security realism in
his thinking sometimes offset rather than reinforce each other.
Secondly, Xi Jinping and his lieutenants’ tendency to present his idealistic vision, norms and
discourse of future world order as an alternative to the Western-centered current international
order could cause alarm in the Western world leading to unintended tensions. As indicated in his
report at the 19th party congress, Xi seems to think that China could offer the world, not just a
new
vision of world order as exemplified by his concept of ‘the community with shared future for
mankind’ but also an alternative pathway of economic and political development for non-Western
countries as exemplified by the ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. By the same token Chinese
media and pundits tend to describe Xi’s vision of ‘community with shared future for mankind’ as
the opposite to Trump’s self-centered ‘America First’ policy and portrait a fragmented world
characterized by ‘a tug of war’ between the ‘two fundamentally different outlooks’.85 This was
perceived by Western analysts as China’s efforts to deliver a clear and strong message about global
leadership: it’s either China or the USA.86 This could also partially explain why the recently
released
US national security strategy defines the competition between the USA and China as ‘a geopolitical
competition between free and repressive visions of world order’.87
Thirdly, while win-win cooperation is a noble idea, it still falls short to resolve the acute issue
of
relative gain in international relations. As IR scholars long pointed out, in a competitive world,
countries care more about relative gain rather than absolute gain.88 That is why international
cooperation among nation-states could be limited and a win-win situation is hard to achieve.
Donald Trump is unhappy with US-China trade relations not because it has not brought benefits to
the USA but rather because he was convinced that China has gained much more from it than the
US does. More importantly, although Xi Jinping demands that the win-win approach should be
applied to all fields of international relations, in fact, it is often more difficult to do so in
security
domains as issues such as territorial and maritime disputes tend to be zero-sum in nature: one
country’s gain often means another’s loss. While a win-win situation is not impossible to create
such as joint exploration and development of maritime resources, it certainly requires greater
persuasion, bargaining and even unilateral concessions. Simply calling for a win-win solution is not
sufficient and could sound a bit shallow.
Fourthly, there is still a perceptual gap on China’s strategic intention behind many of its new
concepts and initiatives between China and the receiving countries leading to suspicions. For
example, Xi Jinping repeatedly told foreign audiences that the Belt and Road initiative is purely an
economic scheme focusing on infrastructure and connectivity. It is not about geopolitical
maneuverings.
It is not designed to ‘invent the wheel, but complement strategies of countries involved by
leveraging their comprehensive strategies’.89 Beijing even refrained from using the word ‘strategy’
to define BRI, but stick with the word ‘initiative’. Yet few political elites in Southeast Asian
countries,
for example, would believe for a second that there is no geopolitical consideration behind it.
Finally, people sometimes also perceive gaps between China’s words on different occasions and
between China’s words and deeds. For instance, Xi Jinping vows solemnly that China does not
want to ‘export’ the Chinese model and will not ask other countries to copy the Chinese practice.90
Yet at the same time, he confidently proclaimed that the Chinese model has become ‘a new option’
for other nations. With regard to the Chinese international behavior, as early as in the 1950s when
China was still very weak, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai already warmed the possible ‘big country
chauvinism’ in Chinese diplomacy. Today China is marching from a ‘big country’ to a ‘strong
country’, how to avoid arrogance and cockiness in Chinese diplomacy could be even more
challenging. Yang Jiechi’s blunt reminder of ASEAN countries that ‘China is a big country’91 is
still vividly remembered by many in the region. The more recent episode of the perceived Chinese
highhandedness in dealing with Singapore due to its position on the South China Sea also raised
concerns among some ASEAN elites about how comfortable it could be to live under a possible
new regional order dominated by China.
China has long claimed that when it rises, it will behave differently from traditional major
powers in history. Although few in the West and the region want to bet on it, it is still laudable
for
Xi Jinping to set a higher bar for China’s international behavior and offer an idealistic vision for
the
world order. In this second paradigm shift in Chinese diplomacy envisioned by Xi Jinping, however,
the glass is still half full and half empty.
Acknowledgments
The research and writing of this article is supported by a research grant provided by University of
Macau (MYRG2015-
00138-FSS).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
The research and writing of this article is supported by a research grant provided by University of
Macau [MYRG2015-
00138-FSS].
Notes on contributor
Jianwei Wang received his B.A. and M.A. in international politics from Fudan University in Shanghai
and his PH.D. in
political science from the University of Michigan. He is currently professor of the Department of
Government and
Public Administration, director of Institute of Global and Public Affairs, University of Macau.
Previously he served as
distinguished professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. He has
also worked and
served in many other leading teaching and research institutions such as Sigur Center for Asian
Studies at George
Washington University, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the East-West Center in Hawaii,
the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, and East Asian Institute in Singapore, Fudan
University and Sun Yat-
Sen University in China. His research interests focus on Sino-American relations, East Asian
security affairs, Chinese
foreign policy and Sino-Japanese relations. He has published extensively in these areas.